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The British sense of reserve has much to commend it, but it
would be difficult to codify in a constitution
The separation of powers is a fundamental feature of many written constitutions, but few of them incorporate
the supportive principle of institutional self-restraint. In this post, Dr Aileen Kavanagh discusses how the
British sense of reserve might inform such a principle and considers the implications of including this value in a
proposed UK written constitution. While reserve might be a desirable quality, however, she concludes
that codifying it would be problematic. 
In f act, much of
constitutional law is
about how power to
allocated, regulated
and constrained,
rather than being
directly concerned
with the content of
particular policies. 
Even human rights
(or constitutional
rights) can be viewed
as devices f or
dividing labour
between the organs
of  the state. Of
course, the idea of
rights is partly
grounded in
important interests
of  individuals and the
duty to treat everyone with respect.  But when we look more closely, we can see that human rights are also
ways of  allocating, dividing and constraining power. For example, some people say that human rights mean
that there are certain things that governments cannot do. And if  those rights are enf orced by the courts,
we might say that constitutional guarantees of  human rights transf er some power f rom the legislature or
executive to the courts, because they may empower the courts to check or limit the elected branches in the
event of  rights-violations. Another way of  looking at the issue is to think that human rights transf er power
f rom the state to the individual. Either way, the issue is one about where power lies, how it can be
allocated, divided and checked in order to protect certain f undamental values. Processes yield outcomes
and if  we get the processes right, then the hope is that they will yield the best outcomes f or society. There
is no perf ect or f ail-saf e way of  achieving this. The challenge of  institutional design is to do the best we
can, given the possibilit ies and shortcomings of  all institutions.
There is one principle which undergirds the separation of  powers and, as f ar as I am aware, does not
f eature prominently (or at all) in many written constitutions. This is the principle of  institutional self -
restraint. Whilst written constitutions can allocate and divide power between institutions, there are always
grey areas at the boundaries between those institutions and the f unctions they carry out. In those grey
areas, you have to rely on a sense of  “constitutional responsibility” amongst the various institutions and
power-holders that they will not overstep the limits of  their powers and will respect the powers of  others. 
As is well-known, the Brit ish constitution has survived f or centuries without any f ormal or legally-def ined
demarcation of  power between the various institutions and power-holders of  the state. But the separation
of  powers is nonetheless achieved largely through the observation of  polit ical conventions and a widely
accepted sense of  constitutional propriety and institutional self - restraint. The division of  labour between
the institutions is held in place largely by this sense of  constitutional propriety amongst the various polit ical
and legal elites, supported by a popular sense of  what propriety entails.
Now, this sense of  constitutional propriety resonates with what many people perceive to be a character-
trait or norm of  behaviour which is valued greatly in Brit ish society. This is the value of being reserved.
Translated onto the institutional and constitutional plane, Brit ish reserve has much to commend it. It can be
a way of  managing the inevitable disagreement between institutions and avoiding open or distastef ul
conf lict between them. Reserve and politeness oil the wheels of  the system and prevent it becoming too
conf lictual.
The question is: can this value of  reserve be written down in a constitution f or the United Kingdom? 
Should it?  There is no doubt that a written constitution f or the United Kingdom could do the basic work of
allocating and dividing f unctions between the appropriate institutions. Those kinds of  provision are evident
in almost all written constitutions. But what is more problematic is to try to articulate the deeper unwritten
norms of  institutional behaviour which undergird this power-allocation.  Perhaps those norms work best
precisely when they are not articulated openly? Maybe the very act of  articulating them openly and explicit ly
undercuts their deep cultural resonance? Written rules, especially if  f ramed in precise terms, end up telling
people what they can and cannot do. My sense is that there is some cultural aversion in the UK to
approaching constitutional structures and norms in this way. There may be a belief  that it is altogether
more desirable (and tastef ul) that the various institutional actors just know how to behave. If  so, then this
may be an argument in f avour of  keeping this part of  the Brit ish constitution unwritten.
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